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The Rationality of Rule-Guided
Behavior: A Statement of the Problem
SCOTT J. SHAPIRO*
It is often thought that rules are problematic because of their over- and
underinc1usiveness. The worry presumably is that it can never be
rational to guide one's conduct by rules because any rule will give this
wrong recommendation in some cases, and it can never be rational to
follow the wrong recommendation.
To my mind, this isn't the real problem with rules, if only because the
problem exists even in those instances when rules are not over- or
underinc1usive-that is, even when they give the right result. For even
when they give the right result, we can still ask: Why do I have a reason
to guide my actions by the rule rather than just doing the right thing? If
it is the right thing to do, then that is the only reason I need, not because
the rule told me to do the right thing.
Let me try to state the full problem in the abstract. Consider any rule
and any action required by the rule. Either the action is supported by the
balance of reasons or it is not. Assume that it is not. In such a case, it
seems as if a rational person should not follow the rule because a
rational person should never act against the balance of reasons. On the
other hand, if the action is supported by the balance of reasons, then he
should perform that act, not because the rule requires this, but because
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rational agents should always act according to the balance of reasons.
It would seem therefore that a rational person has no need for rules:
when rules give the wrong results, it is irrational to follow them; when
they give the right results, it is irrelevant that the rule tells the person to
act in that way.
This is a real problem for the law, because the law contains rules. It
would seem that the law serves no purpose for a rational person. .
Because the dilemma is perfectly general, any legal rule will fall prey
to it. This is true even for rules that are not over- or underinclusive-it
is true for standards as well. But let me illustrate the dilemma by using
two examples: one slightly sensationalistic and the other more mundane.
At the beginning of Philip Howard's book, The Death of Common
Sense, he tells the story of Mother Teresa who took over three abandoned
buildings in the South Bronx and converted them to homeless shelters. I
Her shelters would not be ordinary ones-they would be run by ascetic
principles. No modern appliances would be used. The homeless would
learn how to do everything the "old fashioned" way.
After most of the renovations had been done, her organization applied to
the Housing Board for an occupancy certificate. The Board denied it on the
grounds that the regulations require that any renovated building taller than
three stories must have an elevator, and these buildings did not have one.
Mother Teresa explained that no one would use these elevators, as the
shelter was to be run by ascetic .principles. "Too bad," the Board said.
The law makes no exceptions for ascetics.
I don't know if Mother Teresa sued, but had she filed suit, it seems
clear that she would have failed. The Board's ruling would have been
affirmed in court.
This is strange-the judge who affirmed the denial is making everyone
worse off. Isn't this irrational?
Let's say, on the other hand, that the rules were different and made
exceptions for homeless shelters. Would we want to say that the judge
should allow the shelter to be renovated because the rules require this?
Shouldn't we just say that the judge should allow the renovation just
because it is the sensible outcome?
A more mundane example might be the Statute of Frauds. Suppose
someone comes before a judge with a videotape and one hundred
witnesses that saw him and someone else make a contract for the sale of
hammers totaling $500.
A judge would be obligated, under the DeC's Statute of Frauds, to
dismiss this action. The oral contract is not enforceable because it is not
in writing.
1. PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE 3-5 (1994).
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But this seems unfair and therefore irrational for a moral person-the
rule requires the judge to cause more harm than good by having him
throw out a perfectly good bargained-for agreement.
On the other hand, if the contract was for $499, then the judge would
be allowed to enforce the contract. But would we say that he has reason
to apply the law in this case? Genuine agreements should be enforced
regardless of what the law says.
What is the ultimate problem here? My sense is that the problem has
to do with a clash of perspectives. Rules are essentially backward-
looking: rules give you reasons, when they give you reasons, because
they were adopted in the past. Not only that, but they require you to
ignore the future-you are supposed to follow what you did in the past,
regardless of the future.
Practical rationality, on the other hand, is essentially forward-looking.
You are supposed to ignore sunk costs and simply act so as to make the
rest of your life better. So we get very different pieces of advice: rules
require us to look to the past, whereas rationality requires us to look to
the future.
As I said before, this is a completely general dilemma and it applies to
all rules. But it is even more general than that. It applies to all commitment-
like attitudes, such as, promises, intentions, policies, projects, and the
like. So the dilemma is not just the concern of the legal philosopher-it
is a problem for the decision theorist, philosopher of action, moral
philosopher, political philosopher, and so on. It is also such a deep
problem that legal philosophers are going to have to look elsewhere to
find solutions, inspiration, analogies and the like. For this reason, I
believe, Larry invited Michael Bratman, who is a philosopher of action,
to talk about the same problem as it applies to personal rules. The hope
is that enough people can talk to each other and compare notes so that
we can crack this problem.
As I mentioned, in the philosophical literature, there have been numerous
responses, but let me mention two. The first position, sometimes called
particularism, concedes the force of the dilemma and claims that it is
never rational to be guided by a rule. This is the position, for example, of
the anarchists, who believe that rules and authority can never be
legitimate. I think'that this is Larry's position as well.
The second response tries to explain why a rational agent would
follow a rule even when it gives the suboptimal result in an individual
case.
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This reply points out that sticking to a rule can have long-tenn
benefits even though it has short-tenn costs. If a judge deviates from the
law, this would have deleterious effects on future litigants.
What are the long-tenn benefits of sticking to. rules? Let me mention
one prominent one, namely, the benefit of deterrence.
As we all know, the law has rules, which are used to deter behavior
that is socially undesirable. It threatens to punish acts that it wishes
would not take place.
One example is the Statute of Frauds. The rule is there to prevent
parties litigating evidentiary issues with regards to the existence of
business contracts. If someone doesn't put his contract in writing, then
regardless of its authenticity, the contract will not be enforced.
Deterrence is not a costless activity. Carrying out one's threat may
hann innocent people or retard other socially beneficial goals. Consider
the exclusionary rule. To prevent the constable from blundering in the
future, we let the murderer go free now.
The argument is, however, that the benefits outweigh the costs. If we
didn't pay the costs, we couldn't achieve the deterrence benefit. So
sometimes we have to let genuine oral contracts go unenforced. That is
the price of deterrence.
It would seem as if the dilemma is solved: rules are useful for rational
agents because they can convince others that the rule-follower will act in
certain ways, for example, by deterring them. An agent can be justified
in following a rule when it gives a locally suboptimal result, because
globally, it is maximizing to do so.
Rule-guided behavior, therefore, is not irrational-when we say that
someone should follow a rule even when more hann than good comes
from it, what we mean is that a rule should be followed when in the short
tenn, more hann than good comes from following the rule, but in the
long tenn it will be optimizing to do so.
This may sound commonsensical, but I think the argument as stated is
perverse. To get at its perversity, let me rehearse a general problem
about deterrence discussed by Thomas Schelling in The Strategy of
Conflict?
In his book, Schelling brought out the strange nature of threats. Threats
are strange because they are expressions of intentions to act in the future
in a costly manner, at a time that the action can no longer influence contact.
If the mugger says "Your money or your life," it is unclear why the
victim would turn over his money. Why doesn't the victim reason as
follows: "If he shoots me, then he can't get the money because he will
have to run away and he will be up for murder if he does so. Hence, it
2. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1980).
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would be irrational for him to carry out his threat." And knowing that
the victim will not treat his threat as credible, it is not clear why the
mugger makes the threat in the first place.
Schelling offered the following solution: it may be rational for
someone to try to convince another that he is irrational. The mugger, if
rational, will want to convince the victim that he is irrational and hence
the victim will succumb to his threats. And in the long run, it may be
rational to cultivate and maintain a reputation for irrationality.
Now, when a judge follows through by applying the law in contexts of
deterrence, that is, he is following through on the law's threat, what is
the judge trying to convince future litigants of? That he is irrational?
If at the present time the judge does more harm than good by
following the law, won't the same be true the next time the issue is
raised in court? Won't it be locally suboptimal to enforce the rule then
too? What would make someone think that a judge would enforce the
rule the next time around if that is the case?
Of course, if the judges were believed to be irrational or immoral, then
it might be reasonable for others to rely on judges to apply the law.
However, do we want to say that the Rule of Law rests on such beliefs
and only on such beliefs?
I think the dilemma can be solved without saying that the Rule of Law
is sustained by our thinking that the legal mind is irrational.
My strategy is to point out a hidden assumption of the dilemma. I call
this the "autonomy assumption."
It holds that people who have adopted rules are free not to follow
them. Nevertheless, these people choose to follow the rules each time
they deem the rules applicable. Each act of compliance implies choice.
If this is the case, then the dilemma is a knock-down argument-if a
rule-follower has the ability not to follow his rules, then he shouldn't do
so when it gives the wrong results.
My suggestion, rather, is that rules operate as constraints on action--one
who adopts a rule is constraining his future self to follow it. Adopting a
rule is doing internally what Ulysses was able to do externally when he
lashed himself to the mast. It is to forgo later choice by the operation of
the Will, but it is as real as using some physical mechanism of commitment.
The dilemma therefore dissolves: rules are not irrelevant because they
constrain future action and it may be rational to prevent oneself from
maximizing later on.
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Obviously, I cannot defend my position here, but let me just clarify
one thing that Larry mentioned earlier. He said that I believe that when
people follow rules, they don't do so for reasons. This isn't right. To be
guided by a rule requires that someone treat the rule as a reason and to
act for that reason. So rule-guided behavior is intentional action-I am
simply denying that it is free action. The rule constrains nonconformity,
but it does not compel the intentional action. The agent still has to act
on the rule and to treat it as a reason. Indeed, according to the Constraint
Model, he does have such a reason, namely, because the constraint
renders conformity the optimal option.
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